The governance of economic organization and exchange across the Internet is widely recognized as being a vital part of the emerging new international networked economy. Here, the interface between the economic and the political has been brought sharply into focus as the role of government in the Internet's future development is considered. Through examining different strands of European Union policy activity related to the Internet, this article aims to characterize and offer an explanation for the emergent patterns of governance witnessed. Whilst still at an embryonic stage, it is argued that EU policy displays, thus far, a 'mixed mode' of governance combining, on the one hand, acceptance of the neo-liberal model of self-regulation, with, on the other, a distinctly more interventionist 'hands on' policy with specific commercial and social goals in mind. Liberalizing initiatives in telecommunications and electronic commerce, as well as a self-regulatory approach to Internet content issues, contrast with actively neo-mercantilist activity in such areas as international discussions on the structure and function of ICANN and the .EU domain name regulation, where clear efforts are being made to shape the contours of the European electronic marketplace. It is suggested that EU Internet policy is characterized by negative coordination in a system in which transnational European and global regulatory networks are likely to emerge.
Introduction
The Internet represents one of the most significant technical, economic and social phenomena of the early twenty-first century. From early 'closed' origins within the United States defence and academic communities, it has expanded into an increasingly commercial and globally expanding communications system. Key landmarks in this transition were the agreement of the US National Science Foundation (NSF) to commercial exploitation of its network in the late 1970s, the development of the World Wide Web by Tim Berners-Lee in 1992 and the selling off of the NSF 'backbone' infrastructure to private US telecommunications operators Sprint, Ameritech and Pacific Bell in 1995 [1] . The clear link between the Internet and (much heralded) knowledge-based economic activity has meant that government policy-makers have vaunted it as the golden bullet for post-industrial economic development. Consequently, the governance of economic organization and exchange across the Internet is widely considered to be a vital part of the emerging new international networked economy.
Devising a set of governance arrangements for the Internet presents a number of significant challenges. According to Ypsilanti and Xavier [2] 'the Internet constitutes the best example of a global network with a structure and ubiquity which potentially allows it to be outside the reach of regulation at national or regional levels'. Its technically decentralized nature [3] from the outset militated against any efforts to control or regulate activity occurring across its infrastructure. Associated with this was the emergence of an almost underground 'counterculture' amongst Internet users opposed to any efforts aimed at imposing either a commercial or regulatory order across its terrain. Others argue that meddling national and regional governments, who wish to gain tax revenue from electronic transactions, and moral authoritarians who would like to seriously delimit the content transmitted over the Internet, will be frustrated in their attempts to do so. This extreme neo-liberal perspective views the Internet as a potential nirvana for capitalists, consumers and libertarians in which state influence will be at most marginal [4] .
Whilst the Internet did not emerge from mainstream industrial and commercial structures of the communications industries, such as telecommunications and broadcasting, its characteristic features make it perhaps the most outstanding example of convergence between different parts of the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) sector. Thus, inevitably, arguments in the debate on the Internet's future governance have reflected well-established and current values from both broadcasting and telecommunications, some of which are oppositional in nature, notably regarding the approach to the regulation of communications content. According to the European Commission [5] , the Internet 'is both the symbolic and prime driver of convergence. It is a vehicle for the delivery to users of both existing services (electronic mail, video, sound, voice telephony, for example) and completely new services (e.g. the World Wide Web)'.
Thus, it is evident that both the 'traditional' and 'novel' aspects of the Internet have in considerable part framed the quandary faced by policy makers concerned with devising an acceptable future set of parameters for Internet governance. With these issues in mind, this article focuses on the emergence and development of Internet policy at European Union (EU) level offering, in the process, an explanation for the emergent patterns of governance witnessed. Whilst still at an embryonic stage, it is argued that EU policy displays, thus far, a 'mixed mode' of governance combining, on the one hand, acceptance and promotion of a neo-liberal model of self-regulation with, on the other, a distinctly more interventionist 'hands on' policy with specific economic and social goals in mind. Here, liberalizing initiatives in telecommunications and electronic commerce stand in contrast to actively neo-mercantilist activity in such areas as international negotiations on the structure and function of the International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) -a new global self-regulatory organization for the Internet -as well as legislative initiatives on a .EU domain name and electronic commerce taxation policy, where clear efforts are being made by the EU to shape the contours of the European electronic marketplace. Whilst championing measures to develop a liberalized self-regulatory networked communications market, the EU has also taken action aimed variously at narrowing the digital divide, reducing social exclusion and protecting the economic and social well-being of Internet users. In its attempt to describe and account for both the emergent structural characteristics of the EU Internet policy regime, as well as to posit a model for the likely mechanics of its operation, this paper draws on recent independent work of Jayasuriya [6] and Majone [7] on the topic of contemporary models of regulation.
Characterizing EU internet policy
In a recent article on the role of the regulatory state in an era of globalization, Jayasuriya contends that globalization's complex nature has, for governments, 'preclud[ed] the ability to shape economic outcomes' [6] . This has resulted in a significant change in both institutional forms and methods of governance within states, epitomized in the transition from what is termed positive to negative coordination. Drawing on, and developing, the work of Scharpf [8] , positive coordination, which has been characteristic of the corporatist and developmental state in the mid-to late twentieth century, involves state action aimed at securing a compromise between different interest groups to achieve certain desired outcomes. By contrast, negative coordination involves government action to ensure the smooth and effective operation of independent regulatory institutions created in response to the globalization of certain sectors of the economy. It is argued that, at present, a transition period is being witnessed in which both forms of coordination, and their institutional structures, may be witnessed alongside each other. Further, there will probably emerge a range of different methods of negative coordination based on the specific national values or characteristics present within different states.
Jayasuriya argues that, in any system of negative coordination, the state broadly acts to underpin, rather than replace, the market. Governance structures, thus created, emphasize the development of effective regulatory processes in autonomous self-regulatory institutions. Issues such as transparency and accountability thereby become important, although these are primarily focused on fulfilling institutional objectives [6] . This article argues that the model of negative coordination put forward and exemplified in the banking sector by Jayasuriya is also reflective of the emerging regulatory context of the Internet. To realize this, it must be extended beyond the national context to characterize the emergence of governance structures at the international level. Since the Internet is an increasingly global phenomenon which has not been subject to any government intervention historically, the EU represents an important locus for regulatory efforts with various economic and social goals in mind. The EU has the ability to act both as a focal point for the coordination of national level regulatory arrangements in Europe and a representative of its Member States in fora dealing with the global governance of the Internet.
The operational problems and complexities presented by a system for Internet governance characterized by features of negative coordination can be addressed with reference to Majone's work on regulatory agencies in Europe. He argues that the programme of liberalization witnessed in a number of key industrial sectors through the 1990s, notably telecommunications, has not been accompanied by the creation of appropriate new administrative (regulatory) structures and arrangements able to ensure efficacious functioning of the system, with damaging consequences for the EU's credibility [7] . Majone uses the term agency to encompass 'a variety of organizations -commissions, boards, authorities, services, offices, inspectorates -that perform functions of a governmental nature, and which often exist outside the normal departmental framework of government' [7] . A key issue concerns the appropriate design, undertaken by political entities, of such organizations. At the EU level, an agency, whilst it may ultimately be accountable to one or more of the EU institutions and may even be located within part of an institution such as the European Commission itself, must have sufficient legally recognized independence to satisfactorily undertake its duties. Majone proposes the creation of transnational regulatory networks able to resolve tensions between the national and the European level in regulation. In his model, European-level agencies act as 'central nodes of networks including national agencies as well as international organizations' [7] . It is argued here that this model, whilst likely to face a number of serious challenges, has considerable potential for becoming part of the mechanics of the EU Internet policy regime. Indeed, given key characteristics of the Internet such as liberalization, selfregulation, decentralization and globalization it may well be the only workable mechanism at the disposal of policymakers.
Emerging mixed mode governance and economic aspects of the EU Internet policy regime: policy activity on electronic commerce
In a recent policy statement, the European Commission has argued that 'The Internet is now big enough to exert an influence on the entire economy. The public sector must lead, not trail, in the take-up of new technologies. It must both establish the legal framework for the private sector to flourish and exploit technology to bring more efficient delivery of public service' [9] . The European Union Internet policy regime emerged within the broad context of proposals and initiatives on the Information Society. In 1994, the landmark Bangemann Report [10] declared that by 'Pooling resources that have traditionally been separate, and indeed distant, the information infrastructure unleashes unlimited potential for acquiring knowledge, innovation and creativity' (p. 6). However, little direct reference was made to the Internet beyond the assertion that, 'Rather than remaining merely clients, we in Europe should consider the evolution of INTERNET [sic] closely, playing a more active role in the development of interlinkages' (p. 25). The overtly neo-liberal perspective of the report, due in part to the agenda-setting role played by Directorate-General XIII (then called Telecommunications, Information and Exploitation of Research, now Information Society) of the European Commission and the influence of big business interests in IT and telecommunications policy [11] , was that the creation of the information society should be left to market forces. Since the mid-1980s, the EU had embarked on the gradual liberalization of its telecommunications sector, such that by the end of 1994 its Member States had agreed to liberalize all telecommunications services and infrastructures by 1 January 1998 [12, 13] . In 1999, the EU undertook a review of the European communications sector with the intention of creating a new broader regulatory framework underpinned by the principle of continued liberalization, with greater emphasis on the use of competition policy and, where possible, self-regulation [14] . In light of a recent important, and at times controversial, debate on regulating ICT convergence at EU level [15] , there were nonetheless key limitations to the scope of the proposed new framework: when (as is likely) fully implemented, it will only apply to communications infrastructures and associated services and will not cover communications services content of any kind. Thus, whilst Internet access and transmission services fall within its remit, content services provided over the Internet, such as electronic commerce, will be treated separately [14] .
Electronic commerce * has in recent years formed a significant part of EU Internet policy. Whilst currently valued in the EU at around 17 billion Euro (expected to expand to 340 billion Euro by 2003), commercial revenues are three times smaller than in the USA [17] . From early Research and Development-related origins (principally through the European Strategic Programme for Research in Information Technology, ESPRIT) an Initiative in Electronic Commerce was launched in 1997 [18] . Acknowledging the potential importance of electronic commerce, the initiative laid out a familiar mixed-mode policy path, advocating action in such areas as technical standards, R&D and interoperability, as well as the creation of a European-wide and globally liberalized market for telecommunications infrastructures and services, the latter necessitating work on such matters as data security, protection of intellectual property rights, privacy, taxation, digital signatures and digital certificates and secure electronic payment mechanisms.
Developing regulatory parameters for electronic commerce is considered no less than a task of global strategic economic and political significance. The EU's two main trading competitors, the USA and Japan, issued a joint policy statement on the matter, strongly advocating a neo-liberal approach where the task of government should be the development of measures based on industry self-regulation [19] . The EU, whilst endorsing self-regulation, has also advocated the use of co-regulatory methods. Based on an earlier Commission proposal [20] , the EU agreed a directive on electronic commerce in 2000, with the central aim of creating a legal framework for the free movement throughout the EU, of what are broadly described as information society services. It was argued that 'Despite the global nature of electronic communications, coordination of national regulatory measures at European Union level is necessary in order to avoid fragmentation of the internal market, and for the establishment of an appropriate European regulatory framework' [21] .
The directive exemplifies in certain ways the EU's mixed mode approach to Internet governance since, whilst the overall aim is to create a liberalized electronic marketplace, care is also taken to point out that its provisions should not conflict with social, cultural and democratic initiatives related to the information society which Member States might wish to pursue. Its provisions are loosely specified giving considerable discretion to Member States. For example, Member States should merely encourage trade and professional bodies and consumer associations related to electronic commerce to develop codes of conduct on the type of information which may be transmitted across networks. Similarly, a strong self-regulatory dimension is evident from the fact that Member States must ensure that their laws do not militate against the use of out-of-court settlement procedures in the case of legal disputes related to electronic commerce, although they are only required to encourage such settlement bodies to be set up for this purpose. The directive requires Member States to cooperate with each other by creating contact points to facilitate exchange of information, which would suggest that Majone's transnational European networks are likely to emerge in this area. It is also clear that, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, Member States will have a considerable degree of control over the regulation of e-commerce. For example, they are responsible for determining and enforcing penalties to be applied to those who infringe the directive and have scope for 'maintaining or establishing general or specific legal requirements for contracts which can be fulfilled by electronic means' [21] .
The growth of electronic commercial activity has caused attention to be focused on how, if at all, governments might develop and apply systems of taxation to this potentially important source of revenue. The EU's examination of the issue in the late 1990s led to the establishment of three principles for the taxation of electronic commerce: the existing Value Added Tax (VAT) system would be adopted to cater for electronic transactions; electronic transactions were classified as services, rather than goods; and electronic services should be taxed in the jurisdiction where they are consumed [22] . These were argued to be broadly in line with a set of taxation framework conditions agreed by members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) around the same time [23] .
On the basis of this, the EU proposed two important amendments to existing measures dealing with indirect taxation to extend their reach to electronic commerce. Their significance lies in the overt attempt by the EU to create more favourable conditions for EU companies supplying electronic commercial services. The essential problem was deemed to be that 'electronically delivered services originating within the EU are always subject to VAT irrespective of the place of consumption, whilst those from outside the EU are not subject to VAT even when delivered within the EU' [24] . Thus, by employing the 'taxation at point of consumption' principle, the EU resolved to require non-EU located (as well as EU) companies supplying electronic services to the EU to levy VAT on those services. Furthermore, operationalization of this principle meant that European companies would no longer have to charge any VAT on services which they exported from the EU to another jurisdiction. Whether (and how much) VAT was levied on these services would be up to the government of the consumer of the particular service in question.
Overall, these examples of new EU policy related to electronic commerce illustrate a mixed-mode perspective. On the one hand, the electronic commerce directive aims to develop an open liberalized marketplace. By contrast, the policy activity related to the taxation of electronic commerce clearly illustrates neomercantilist activity in which the EU has attempted to configure the electronic marketplace in a way which promotes the interests of its 'domestic' companies. As a consequence, companies from non-EU jurisdictions at the leading edge of electronic commerce (notably those from the US) will now experience less favourable trading conditions in the EU. The taxation initiative also clearly illustrates the EU Member States' intention to use electronic commerce for revenue-generation purposes and stands in contrast to the US, which has been more cautious in applying taxation in what is seen as an emerging market. Indeed, the EU is the first jurisdiction to impose taxation measures of this kind. Its position was neatly summed up by the Economic and Social Committee which noted that 'the existing competitive disadvantage of European firms vis-à-vis third-country competitors needs to be eliminated. This need arises both from the danger of tax erosion to the detriment of government budgets, as well as from the need to prevent damaging tax competition which could weaken the European Union's position in the world trading system' [25] .
EU Internet policy in a global context: ICANN, the USA and the EU
The global nature of the Internet and the pressing need felt amongst governments in Europe and the USA, in particular, to take advantage of its economic potential has led to a consideration of global governance arrangements for certain of its key economic functions. The European Commission has been notable in its calls for the development of international coordinative efforts related to aspects of the Information Society [26] . Since large economic powers strive to ensure that their regulatory models are exported internationally [27] , it was no surprise when as part of its Framework for Electronic Commerce initiative, in 1997, the USA issued a landmark Green Paper on the future of Internet governance. The EU response and subsequent negotiations are illustrative of the potential for political-economic conflict between the world's two most powerful trading blocs. The European Commission considered the US proposals as a thinly veiled attempt to gain strategic control over the twenty-first-century electronic marketplace. Whilst undoubtedly in favour of the neo-liberal nature of the project, the Commission declared that 'The current US proposals, in the name of the globalization and privatization of the Internet, consolidate US jurisdiction over the Internet as a whole' [28] . Epitomizing both negative coordination and mixed-mode governance, the Commission argued that 'It will be necessary to ensure that the responsibilities of the public authorities towards society and the economy at large are effectively linked to the functions of any industry self-regulatory bodies' [28] . For the Internet this clearly implies a somewhat different mode of governance from the US model.
As a result of the Commission's protestations, the US government revised its proposals in 1998 (which it published as a White Paper), taking into account many of the EU's criticisms, which was enough for the Commission to advocate EU participation in the negotiation process launched by this White Paper [29] , although it became apparent that a number of crucial issues were still to be resolved, such as the nature of EU representation in what was then termed the 'new IANA' organization, subsequently named ICANN, the establishment of ICANN under US law, and issues of taxation in an international electronic commerce environment. Acknowledging the limited progress made, the Commission declared that, 'the US government has also recognized that the Internet now has a major international dimension, an important step forward, which the EU can endorse and encourage. Such a realization has not come lightly in certain US circles which still identify the Internet with US R&D programmes and USbased organizations' [29] .
ICANN was eventually established as an international, not-for-profit organization with responsibility for the global management of Internet Protocol (IP) address space allocation and protocol parameter assignment, Internet domain name system management, and Internet root server system management [30] .
* It is an interesting example of global-level negative coordination governance, although it has dubiously argued that it does not undertake 'Internet "governance" in the broad sense: We are not governing the Net or the people on it. But we are not merely a charity organization, managing our own resources for our vision of the public benefit . . . positions on important policy and management issues need to be derived from public consensus' [31] .
Since the establishment of ICANN, there is evidence of cautious monitoring of its self-regulatory remit by the EU. The Commission itself has indicated a rather more interventionist role for the EU than the self-regulatory form of governance would suggest, interacting as necessary with a range of global level organizations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), negotiating bilaterally with governments and playing a key role in ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). The distinct proactivity of the EU has been spelled out very clearly as going 'beyond a simple . . . oversight of the ICANN process' [32] .
Political-economic tensions have been evident in complaints from the Commission that the staff of ICANN are all based in North America and that there is an under-representation of the European public and private sector in ICANN's Domain Name System Organization user constituencies [31] . The Commission again underlined its view that, 'The necessary governmental oversight of ICANN should be exercised on a multilateral basis, in the first instance through the Governmental Advisory Committee [of ICANN]' [32] . The issue of Internet domain name registration and management is of clear strategic economic interest to EU firms and government -access to such names can determine the visibility of an organization on the Internet and thus its chances of commercial success. In July 1997, the Clinton administration, as part of its Framework for Electronic Commerce, took the decision to privatize the Internet domain name system. The EU has complained that this was an attempt to stifle internationally generated (in the WIPO) proposals for domain name expansion in favour of a number of new, US-proposed and delegated, generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs). The Commission has also criticized ICANN for making little progress on the matter [32] .
Top Level Domains have also been the subject of a number of legal disputes, mostly in terms of speculative trademark registration. Indeed, the Commission has claimed a policy success in this regard with the adoption by a number of domain name registrars of a 'standard agreement for all gTLDs DNS registrations that would effectively achieve a uniform dispute resolution procedure as advocated by the EU and accepted by WIPO' [32] . Nonetheless, the EU Council of Ministers has recently declared 'that the reform of Internet management is still going through a transitional phase, and consequently the objectives which the European Union has set itself on domain name management cannot be regarded as having been achieved' [33] . ICANN has a Uniform Disputes Resolution Policy relating to dispute settlements between trademark and domain name holders in the .com, .net and .org gTLDs. Any disputes over trademarks in domains must be resolved either through agreement between the parties, arbitration or court action before ICANN can alter the arrangements regarding any domain name [33] . Between self-regulation and intervention in the networked economy
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Journal of Information Science, 28 (4) 2002, pp. 285-296 *To achieve these tasks, the Corporation is assisted by three supporting organizations. The Address Supporting Organization (ASO), formed in August 1999, considers policy on IP addresses, which are the unique numerical identifiers for networked computers across the Internet, The Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO) concerns the pneumonic naming system covering Internet locations and resources. The Domain Name System allows the translation of pneumonic addresses into IP addresses. The DNSO is made up of a Names Council and a General Assembly. The former tries to build consensus in the organization. It is made up of representatives from seven designated constituencies of interest, some of which are very different from others, and has carried out studies on the creation of new generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs) and global awareness of the Internet. Finally, the Protocol Supporting Organization (PSO) focuses on the parameters for Internet protocols, which are technical standards for information exchange and communications management across the Internet. These supporting organizations supply three directors each to the ICANN board, as well as policy advice and recommendations on their specific areas of expertise.
The creation of a .EU top level domain name
Expansion of the number of TLDs raises important political-economic issues, since a new TLD opens a new space in the electronic marketplace facilitating the forging of new identities and the aggregation of new interests, both common and competing. It has even been suggested that new 'national-like virtual communities' are thus possible [34] . With this in mind, the proposal by the European Commission for a .EU TLD represented further evidence of its neo-mercantilist attempt to establish an EU presence in the governance of the Internet through carving out an electronic Single European Market akin to that created in the mid to late 1980s in the non-electronic marketplace. The EU claims this first ever regional-level TLD will promote electronic commerce, through facilitating easier access to the Internet for European business, improving the interoperability of computer networks across Europe, and will give a higher profile to the EU Single Market on the Internet. A proposed EU Regulation aimed to establish a domain registry * and a public policy framework within which it may function [35] . The European Commission will be given responsibility for ensuring that the registry operates effectively † through preventing speculative and abusive registration of domain names and operating a non-judicial dispute settlement procedure conforming to criteria established by WIPO. It will be assisted by a committee formed as part of a recent directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications services in the EU [36] . It seems likely that, if this system begins to operate, a trans-European network of agencies will be established across the EU in which the European Commission will feature as an important regional level coordinative node.
The EU proposal was favourably received, on the whole, by European companies and representative associations [37, 38] , although the Commission was urged not to develop a separatist policy [39] . Some also considered current national country code TLDs to be adequate [40] . Doubts were expressed over how a regional TLD such as .EU would sit with the existing system of country code and generic domain names and uncertainty was expressed about the claim that the new domain name would promote e-commerce in Europe [41] . It was argued that the stipulation that a company must be established in the EU before a .EU domain name could be registered should be removed [42] , or at least should be widened to allow non-EU European companies to register [43] . Mueller's argument that -in an increasingly globalized economic environment populated by footloose multinational corporationsthe use of national location label TLDs could be used to impose cultural/economic protectionism through the establishment of 'linguistic or culturally based content quotas on the web (ideas that have been broached in Canada and France)' [44] could be applied to the .EU initiative. In December 2000, ICANN proposed seven new generic TLDs, ‡ which arguably went some way towards negating reasons put forward to justify the .EU initiative as a response to scarcity of name space.
Social issues and EU Internet policy
Whilst EU Information Society policy is dominated by a neo-liberal policy agenda, it has by no means been subsumed by it [45] . In 1994, the EU produced an Information Society Action Plan focusing on the four key areas: regulation and the creation of an appropriate legal framework for ICTs; the evolution of ICT networks, services, applications and content; the social and cultural aspects of ICTs; and the promotion of the Information Society [46] . An important dimension in the broadening of the EU's perspective on the Information Society has been the interest taken and influence exerted by those parts of the European Commission responsible for Regional Policy (Directorate-General XVI) and Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs (Directorate-General V). In a key policy position paper, the latter argued that the Information Society 'represents the most fundamental change in our time, with enormous opportunities for society as a whole, but *The registry's main functions are to organize , administer and manage the .EU TLD upholding the principles of quality, efficiency, reliability and accessibility; to observe public procurement rules; to impose and collect an annual fee; and to register domain names in the.EU TDL to any undertaking with its registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the community or any organization established within the EU or any natural person resident within the EU. †A contract will be drawn up between two parties specifying things such as conditions of Commission supervision as well as general organization, administration and management of the domain by the registry. ‡ These are: .aero (air transport industry), .biz (businesses), .coop (cooperatives), .info (unrestricted use), .museum (museums), .name (individual registrations) and .pro (accountants, lawyers and physicians).
with risks for individuals and regions' [47] . It noted the key role which ICTs can play in regional and local development and urged that public policies be devised to promote employment, skills and education. DGV was also responsible for the formation of the High Level Group on the Information Society, made up predominantly of academics and other public sector representatives, which produced a report calling for Information Society policies to increase social inclusion, create healthier living, re-prioritize full employment and develop cultural production and consumption at the local level [48] .
In 1999, the EU launched its eEurope initiative, serving as another example of its mixed-mode policy perspective on the information society. The programme goals are to facilitate online access for business, the public sector and citizens, to encourage the development of a culture of electronic entrepreneurship in Europe and to make sure that policy actions taken build social inclusion and cohesiveness. The following year an Action Plan was agreed with a series of policy targets relating to areas such as Internet access, work, electronic commerce, digital content, transport, network security, young people, participation and online government services [17] .
A significant dimension of the social aspect of EU information society policy is the use of high-level and advisory groups, experts and other mechanisms which tend to place social players in its policy-making framework. Internet policy and regulation could be said to 'fit' this model well. An interesting consequence of this scenario is evidence of distinct differences of approach between government, business and the individual to the 'social' aspects of Internet regulation. Business interests operating in the brave new world of the digital economy emphasize the importance of creating an environment in which they can trade safely and securely. There is also, however, a vociferous body of opinion highlighting inherent social dangers emanating from the posting and exchange of illegal and harmful content across the Internet, notably political extremism, pornography and paedophilia, organized crime, and computer hacking: the so-called 'four horsemen of the Internet'. By contrast, there are those, such as campaigners for freedom of expression, privacy and freedom of information, who regard the Internet as a free space, where regulation is neither necessary nor desirable.
This complex of diverse and often differing interests provides the backdrop to the attempted development by the EU of a policy on the social and cultural aspects of Internet content regulation. In 1997, the European Commission proposed an Action Plan on Promoting Safe Use of the Internet [49] . Whilst recognizing that the vast majority of content is entirely acceptable, the Action Plan identified a range of content related to issues such as national security, the protection of minors and human dignity, information security, and the protection of intellectual property which is illegal. * It also defines harmful content as that which is permitted but which must have a restricted distribution. The EU advocated a mixed-mode approach reliant primarily on self-regulation by industry and individuals † where legal action is taken only where such selfregulation is seen to have failed.
In developing its policy, the EU has liaised closely with a network of social and economic actors, notably Internet Content Rating for Europe (INCORE) -an organization containing representatives from the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF), the Electronic Commerce Organization (ECO) and Childnet International (INHOPE). It has also formed expert groups, such as the Bertlesmann Group, and consulted with Internet service and content providers. The control of harmful and illegal content is a highly complex global issue which has by no means been resolved. In attempting to address the multifarious and controversial aspects of content regulation, the EU has been careful to advocate, yet again, a broadly self-regulatory approach which essentially aims to develop a compromise position, addressing the potentially countervailing issues of freedom of speech and restrictions on, and control over, content viewed.
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Journal of Information Science, 28 (4) 2002, pp. 285-296 *Illegal content relates to national security (instructions on bomb-making, illegal drug production, terrorist activities), protection of minors (abusive forms of marketing, violence, pornography), protection of human dignity (incitement to racial hatred or racial discrimination), economic security (fraud, instructions on pirating credit cards), information security (malicious hacking), protection of privacy (unauthorized communication of personal data, electronic harassment), protection of reputation (libel, unlawful comparative advertising), and intellectual property (unauthorized distribution of copyright works, e.g. software or music).
†Self-regulatory measures include the creation of contentmonitoring schemes, demonstration and application of effective filtering services and compatible content rating systems, and promotion of awareness actions directed at users, in particular children, parents and teachers.
Conclusions
The development and implementation of a set of regulatory arrangements for governing the Internet is still in its relative infancy. Nonetheless, as in the telecommunications sector as a whole, there is little doubt that 'Global issues requiring international resolution will become increasingly important. A structure must be designed to meet the needs for efficient, expeditious and responsive global governance' [50] . For the Internet, a phenomenon whose economic parameters are international -if not truly global -in nature, it has been argued that there is evidence of the emergence of a policy regime of negative coordination, similar to that recently characterized by Jayasuriya [6] at the national level in relation to the financial sector. Here, at both the EU and global levels, a project largely underpinned by the public sector's neo-liberal faith in free market forces has resulted in the acceptance and promotion of measures to encourage the emergence of self-regulatory structures. Both EU's e-commerce directive and .EU regulation aim to promote self-regulatory developments. However, as illustrated, there is also evidence that promotion of systems of negative coordination is motivated by national and regional governments with the desire to further economic and political self-interest. As such, often opposing differences of approach become apparent, which may come into open conflict in international fora. Thus, for example, the EU and the US, both adherents of free-market self-regulatory governance for the Internet, have clashed on the specific arrangements for such a system. Likewise, the .EU domain name regulation and electronic commerce taxation initiative can be viewed as examples of neomercantilist opportunism by the EU to carve out a European territory in the global electronic marketplace. This paradoxical display of neo-liberalism and neomercantilism exemplifies the mixed mode approach thus far evident in EU Internet policy.
The more social aspects of EU Internet policy also display a mixed mode of behaviour. Whilst the EU has been proactive in devising an Internet Action Plan and bringing together a transnational network of interested parties on the control of Internet content, it has advocated primarily a self-regulatory approach placing onus on both economic actors (for example, through drawing up codes of practice) and citizens (for example, through use of software filters) in determining content posted and exchanged across the Internet. However, some argue that the EU has been naive about how much selfregulation can achieve and warn against the dangers of 'privatized systems of censorship' [51] .
The emergence of new governance arrangements raises the important question of how such a system might operate in practice. As argued above, the diffuse, decentralized, nature of the Internet combined with the emerging international, self-regulatory nature of its governance suggests that a coordinative pattern of regulation may be the most likely mode to succeed. In the European Union context, there is early evidence of Majone's model of trans-European regulatory networks emerging in, for example, the dispute settlement arrangements laid out in the electronic commerce directive, a networked pattern of governance proposed for the management of the .EU domain name, and the codes of conduct approach to Internet content regulation. Despite this, the new self-regulatory network paradigm with government operating at arm's length is likely to face a series of important hurdles.
In this respect, Kleinwachter [33] argues that 'ICANN is a 'new type' of global organization without any precedent, representing different types of stakeholders from all over the world, and is organized in a somewhat confusing and mixed way with both elected bodies and nominated representatives . . . requir [ing] an unusual triangle where the "Business World" and the "Internet Community" are equally represented in the highest decision making body on the top, while governments as the third global player have only an "advisory function"'. The role of ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) is likely to become more important in the future, and may be the source of increased direct global governmental regulation of the Internet. The European Commission has clearly stated its view that ICANN is taking decisions with very broad economic and societal ramifications, normally the domain of governments. It has argued that 'should ICANN extend its influence tacitly or de facto to other policy areas where governments found that the interests of their general public were being affected, or in the event of a significant disagreement between the Board and the GAC, then the current relationship would probably have to be revisited' [17] . This might entail a redefinition of the GAC's and ICANN's role, to create a more coregulatory organizational structure, and might even threaten the latter's existence. Should the global electronic marketplace develop sufficiently, competition policy issues are likely to play a much more important part in the global governance of the Internet and ICANN may become less strategically important than fora such as the World Trade Organization.
The difficulties of undertaking the day-to-day operational tasks assigned to ICANN are already emerging. In a recent self-evaluation by its DNSO Review Task force, it became apparent that within this very important part of the Corporation there is evidence of very divergent views and interests. It has been suggested that its General Assembly has not been given enough participatory right or authority in the decision-making process. Haphazard attendance in DNSO Working Groups has meant that they are not in a satisfactory position to portray consensus views from the Internet community. The DNSO Names Council was found to have a lack of structure and rules for making decisions, not helped by its voluntary nature, and has been criticized for spending too much time on administrative procedures. It was accused of being insular within ICANN, unrepresentative of different interests, subjective in its decisions and weak in leadership and enforcement [52] . The process undertaken to allocate the new generic TLDs has also been heavily criticized [53] .
It has been suggested that the Internet will reduce the ability of the nation state to exert control over revenue and resource distribution [54] , although policy developments on taxation of electronic commerce at OECD and EU level suggest that this is unlikely to occur. Signs that governments are trying to achieve a greater influence in Internet governance have been viewed with alarm in certain quarters, although from the administrative problems which are apparent in an admittedly youthful ICANN, it has yet to be proven that a not-forprofit organization operating in a self-regulatory mode of governance will be any more efficient than an independent regulator funded through the public purse. Furthermore, whilst a self-regulatory model has been championed by neo-liberals and, naturally, the business community, it will be interesting to see how operationally efficacious a truly representative selfregulatory body can be (i.e. one that contains consumers and users of the Internet given an equitable voice in decision-making). It may well be that the complexity of the task in hand, as well as the expertise and commitment needed from the participants, will require the development of networked national, European and ultimately global Internet governance arrangements which are co-regulatory, rather than selfregulatory in nature: recent evidence from the UK telecommunications sector suggests that limited participation by relevant parties is one important reason for this [55] . With co-regulation, there is direct involvement in the regulatory process by a number of parties which may include an independent, governmentfunded regulator, consumer groups, industry representation, and perhaps a governmental agency.
The Internet as a series of technical components exemplifies Information and Communications Technologies as enablers of economic activity. Whilst the electronic commercial environment is different in many respects (mostly functional) from traditional market forms, it is nonetheless very similar in its most crucial dimensions. From its operation, there emerges a distribution of resources, with winners and losers in terms of economic and social welfare. Ultimately, there will be real world consequences across different geographical territories. Through its mixed-mode approach to Internet policy, the EU has acknowledged the strategic economic and social significance of public policy measures for the Internet economy, although the journey of developing a stable, efficacious and broadly accepted set of governance arrangements for its many important elements is far from complete.
